Analysing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Policies:The Case of the Kyoto Protocol by Almer, Christian & Winkler, Ralph
        
Citation for published version:
Almer, C & Winkler, R 2015 'Analysing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Policies: The Case of
the Kyoto Protocol' Bath Economics Research Working Papers, vol. 39/15, Department of Economics, University
of Bath, Bath, U. K.
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Analysing the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Policies: The Case of the Kyoto 
Protocol 
Christian Almer and Ralph Winkler
No. 39 /15 
BATH ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS 
Department of Economics  
Analysing the Effectiveness of International
Environmental Policies: The Case of the Kyoto
Protocol∗
Christian Almer† and Ralph Winkler‡
June 29, 2015
Abstract
We study the effectiveness of emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol with respect
to reducing CO2 emissions. Using country-level and US state-level panel data and
employing the synthetic control method, we do not find a significant effect for any
of the major emitters among the Annex B countries with binding emission targets.
We also show that – in general – evaluating the effectiveness of international envi-
ronmental policies at the country level comes with a number of empirical challenges
that may invalidate findings based on more traditional panel data approaches.
Keywords: Climate Policy, International Environmental Agreements, Kyoto Pro-
tocol, Synthetic Control Method
JEL-Classification: K33, Q54
∗We would like to thank Alberto Abadie, Philip Cooper, Timo Goeschl, Michael Greenstone, Steve
Stillman, Ulrich Wagner and seminar/conference participants at Bath, Chicago, and Lucerne for invalu-
able comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
†Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath, 3 East, Bath BA2
7AY, UK; c.almer@bath.ac.uk
‡Department of Economics and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Bern,
Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland; mail@ralph-winkler.de
1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is – to date – the only international climate policy with binding
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for at least some countries. However, the initial
commitment period ranging from 2008–2012 has already expired and no agreement on
a follow-up treaty has been reached so far.1 In fact, for almost a decade we have been
witnessing the struggle of the international community to agree on a successor of the
KP. This tenacious process is no surprise given the rich theoretical literature on climate
treaties and its disillusioning findings regarding the likelihood of a global agreement (see,
for example, Finus, 2008 for a review of this literature). In addition, the KP has been
heavily criticized since its emergence in 1997.2 Yet, the international community persists
on the idea of a global follow-up agreement with emission targets for a broader set of
countries that is hoped to be agreed on during the COP 21 conference in Paris in December
2015.
In contrast to the theoretical economic literature and the widespread criticism men-
tioned above, this endeavor is supported by a recent and increasing body of empirical
literature on the effectiveness of the KP. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), Aichele and
Felbermayr (2013) and Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso (2015) consistently find that
countries with binding emission targets under the KP have lower CO2 emissions than
they would have had in the absence of these targets. In fact, they estimate a statistically
significant average CO2 reduction effect of 7 to 10%.
In this paper, we argue that the statistically significant treatment effect is spurious and
likely to be caused by a misspecification of the empirical model. We test for the existence of
observable emission reductions in 15 major Western Annex B countries with binding GHG
emission targets under the KP. We show that opposing trends in CO2 emissions between
countries with (Annex B countries) and without (non-Annex B countries) binding emission
targets under the KP lead to a violation of the common trend assumption which is critical
in this particular setting (difference-in-differences or extensions of it). Not addressing the
1A second commitment period of the KP was proposed in 2012, known as the Doha Amendment.
However, several countries that participated in the first commitment period have withdrawn their support.
2In December 1997 The Economist (1997) already prognosticated that the USA will never be able
to ratify the KP, as it would never be approved by the U.S. Senate. Prins and Rayner (2007) criticize
its inflexible top-down architecture, which had been borrowed from past international treaties regulating
chlorofluorocarbons, sulphur emissions and nuclear weapons, and “was always the wrong tool for the
nature of the job.” Also the economics profession found little praise for the KP. While Barrett (1998)
argued from a political economy point of view that the KP hardly deters non-participation and non-
compliance, Copeland and Taylor (2005) criticize that its design neglects important lessons from trade
theory. Other authors animadvert the level of the emission targets (e.g., Tol, 2000) or discuss the challenges
of the flexibility mechanisms (Zhang and Wang, 2011).
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opposing trends results in highly significant treatment effects which vanish entirely once
the pre-treatment trends have been balanced. We explicitly address the common trend
assumption (and selection into treatment) by employing the synthetic control method
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).
The main obstacle to analyzing the effect of the KP on the emissions of Annex B
countries is the identification of the correct counterfactual, i.e. business-as-usual (BAU),
emissions to which the actual GHG emissions have to be compared. When employing
the synthetic control method (SCM), the counterfactual for each “treated” country (i.e.,
Annex B country that ratified the KP and, thus, is subject to GHG emission targets) is
constructed by a weighted average of “non-treated” regions (i.e., regions without binding
emission targets under the KP) such that the actual country and its synthetic counterpart
coincide as much as possible with respect to emissions before the “treatment” and in all
relevant economic characteristics that are unaffected by it. The difference of the emission
paths of the actual country and its synthetic counterpart following the treatment reveals
the influence the binding emission targets of the KP imposed on the development of
GHG emissions. The identification of the “true” counterfactual hinges crucially on the
availability of appropriate controls in the control group (also called donor pool). Given
that Annex B countries differ considerably from non-Annex B countries in many important
characteristics, we run an additional specification using US state level data in the donor
pool.
We find no statistically significant and persistent treatment effect for any of the Annex
B countries under investigation. This holds no matter whether we consider for the time
of treatment (i) the year of ratification of each Annex B country (e.g., 2002 for the
EU countries), (ii) the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 or (iii) the year 2005
when the Protocol entered into force. We provide evidence, however, that more drastic
interventions like the collapse of the former Soviet Union did have a significant effect on
the CO2 emissions of Poland (see Section 3.4). We also find that – overall – the use of
US states as the control group is preferable, as the emission paths are very similar to
those of Annex B countries. Finally, we argue that the applied econometrician faces very
similar challenges when analyzing other types of international environmental policies. As
a consequence, the application of the SCM, which allows us to address these challenges
adequately, may be preferable to more traditional panel data approaches that are likely
to produce invalid results.
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2 Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets under the Kyoto
Protocol
In the Kyoto Protocol (KP), initially adopted on 11 December 1997, 37 industrialized
countries (and the European Union), so called Annex B countries, committed to reduce
the emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% on average over the period between
2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels. More specifically, each of the 37 Annex B countries
accepted individual emission targets that had to be met by the end of the first commitment
period.
In this paper we aim to assess the effectiveness of the KP with respect to its primary
target, namely the reduction of GHG emissions in Annex B countries with binding emis-
sion targets. Therefore, we consider the ratification of the KP by a country with a binding
emission target under the KP as a “treatment” and investigate the effect of this treat-
ment. To answer this question it is crucial to identify the counterfactual GHG emissions
that each treated country would have had emitted were they not subject to the treatment
and compare these to the actual GHG emissions of the respective country. The resulting
difference, the treatment effect, is a measure of the effectiveness of the KP in the sense
that it elicits the efforts of a particular country to reduce GHG emissions given that the
KP entered into force.3
To elicit this treatment effect we are confronted with two major obstacles. First, while
it is clear which countries we consider as treated, i.e. countries with binding emission
targets under the KP that also ratified it, the exact timing of this treatment for each
country is much less obvious. One might argue that the date of ratification is the date of
treatment, as only from that point onwards a country adopted the emission target into
national legislation and, thereby, certifies that it considers the emission target imposed by
the KP as binding. In fact, we shall use the date of ratification as the time of treatment
in our main specification.4 However, there are two other plausible dates for the time of
treatment:
1. We consider December 1997, when the KP was adopted, as the earliest time that
3Note that this treatment effect cannot elicit any effect that the KP (or its enaction) might have had
on the emissions of all countries (e.g., due to a increase in the public awareness of the matter), treated or
non-treated. In this sense the treatment effect may underestimate the effectiveness of the KP. To estimate
this “total” effect, we would need to observe a twin Earth that is identical to our Earth in all aspects
short of the enaction of the KP. Obviously, there is no way to construct such an ideal counterfactual.
4Throughout the paper, we consider the year of the treatment event as the treatment year if the event
took place in the third or forth quarter and we consider the year before the event as the treatment year
if the event took place in the first or second quarter.
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these emission reduction targets may already have influenced the countries that
finally ratified the KP, as the emission targets were already known then. As a con-
sequence, we run an additional specification with 1997 as the time of treatment.
2. After the US withdrew its support in 2001 it was not clear whether the KP will
actually enter into force, because of the two hurdles the KP had to take.5 Due to
this uncertainty, even countries that ratified the KP may have been reluctant to take
costly measures to reduce GHG emissions before the KP entered into force. With
Russia’s ratification in November 2004 the protocol had taken both hurdles and
became effective in early 2005. As a consequence, we run an additional specification
where we consider the year 2004 as the time of treatment.
Second, to elicit the treatment effect it is crucial that there are other countries (or,
more general, regional entities) that did not receive the treatment. In our case these can be
regions without any binding GHG emission targets under the KP or countries that would
have had binding emission targets under the KP but did not ratify it. If all countries
(regional entities) were equal in all respects apart from receiving the treatment or not,
the treatment effect would simply be given by the difference in GHG emissions of treated
and non-treated countries. Of course, not all countries are alike. Even worse, there is a
clear selection bias with respect to the treatment: Annex B countries roughly cover the
industrialized world.
Figure 1 shows the aggregated (average) CO2 emissions of Annex B and non-Annex B
countries relative to their 1997 emissions between 1980 and 2010. We observe that CO2
emissions were relatively stable for Annex B countries, while they increased considerably
for non-Annex B countries in particular after 2000. While the different development in the
post-treatment period, i.e. after 1997, may be the effect of the treatment, the differences
in the pre-treatment period give rise to serious concerns. The key identifying assumption
in settings where we observe the outcome of interest for treated units and controls prior
and after the intervention (including difference-in-differences) is the common trend as-
sumption. It says that – in the absence of the treatment – treated units and controls must
share a common trend.6 Although it is impossible to directly test for a common trend
without imposing strong assumptions about the treatment effect, the drastic and statis-
tically significant differences in pre-treatment trends shown in Figure 1 clearly indicate a
5According to the rules of the KP, it only enters into force if at least 55 countries ratify it and ratifying
countries account for at least 55% of 1990 GHG emissions from Annex B countries.
6Differences in the absolute value of the outcome of interest and (to some extend) covariates are less
of a problem, as they can be absorbed by the use of fixed-effects.
4
Figure 1: Development of average CO2 emissions for Annex B countries, non-Annex B
countries and US states
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Note: Graph shows aggregated CO2 emissions relative to 1997 emissions for all Annex B countries, non-Annex B countries
for which data is available for the period 1980–2010 and US states. For Annex B countries this excludes many Eastern
European countries (e.g., Russia and the Ukraine), as data start in 1990 or later. Including Eastern European countries
would lead to a significant dip starting in the late 1980s/early 1990s due to the collapse of the Former Soviet Union, as
shown in Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso (2015).
violation in case of the KP. Apart from the differences in trends, non-Annex B countries
also differ significantly with respect to other relevant country characteristics, as we shall
show in Section 3.2.
Non-Annex B countries face an additional problem that may invalidate them as suit-
able controls. According to the rules of the KP, Annex B countries may achieve their
emission targets either via domestic emission reductions or through the use of one of the
three flexibility mechanisms: emissions trading, joint implementation and clean develop-
ment mechanism. Although the KP clearly states that the use of flexibility mechanisms
should only be supplemental to domestic emission reduction efforts, they may blur the
distinction between treated and non-treated countries. In particular the clean develop-
ment mechanism encourages Annex B countries to cooperate with non-Annex B countries
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to reduce GHG emissions of non-Annex B countries. These emission reductions in non-
Annex B countries can then be credited to the reduction target of the supporting Annex
B countries. Thus, also the emissions of non-Annex B countries may be influenced by the
KP, even though they do not face any direct reduction obligations.
In order to circumvent the problems associated with using non-Annex B countries as
the control group to estimate counterfactual GHG emissions for treated countries, we also
use US state level data in an alternative specification. US states are untreated, as the
US did not ratify and, thus, never had any binding obligations under the KP. US state
level data comes with several key advantages: First, the differences in trends between CO2
emissions of US states and Annex B countries are rather moderate, as shown in Figure
1. Second, as US states clearly belong to the industrialized world, the differences in other
key country characteristics are more moderate, although still significant (see Section 3.2).
Finally, as the US did not ratify the KP, they are also not part of any of the flexibility
mechanisms.
3 Empirical Analysis
In the following, we aim at eliciting the treatment effect of being committed to a specific
emission target under the KP for each treated country individually. The main challenge for
estimating such an effect is a missing data problem (Rubin, 1976), as we cannot observe
a particular country having both a binding emission target and no emission target at
the same time. Moreover, countries with and without binding emission targets may differ
systematically with respect to both their emission paths and other important country
characteristics. Therefore, average CO2 emissions of countries with targets cannot be
simply compared to average emissions of countries that have none, i.e. the assignment of
emission targets cannot be treated as random (Rubin, 1976, 1978, 2005).
3.1 The Synthetic Control Method
There are several potential strategies to solve this problem (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). In cases as ours, where different groups are either exposed or not exposed to
some kind of treatment over a certain time period, the most often applied method is a
differences-in-differences (DiD) approach (Bertrand et al., 2004) or an extension of it.
We employ the synthetic control method (SCM) developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015). It can be seen as an extension of
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a standard DiD and allows us to account for the various empirical challenges described
above. More specifically, the synthetic control approach exhibits three key advantages
over classical DiD estimation that renders it particularly suitable for the present research
question.
First, SCM is able to re-balance treated units and controls with respect to both (i)
the pre-treatment development of the CO2 emissions themselves and (ii) important pre-
dictors of selection into the treatment, i.e. being part of the industrialized world. Second,
SCM allows to estimate the counterfactual emissions path for every single country and
every year following the adoption of the KP. Thus, we do not only get an average ef-
fect for all countries and all time periods under investigation, but we are also able to
identify country-year-specific developments and characteristics. We are therefore able to
identify potentially heterogeneous treatment effects which may be, for example, the result
of highly heterogeneous targets. Third, and most important, the standard DiD approach
faces an additional challenge when analyzing counterfactual outcomes. On the one hand,
a country’s level of GHG emissions depends on several socio-economic factors that should
be controlled for in a regression analysis to avoid an omitted variable bias. On the other
hand, almost all of these factors may also be influenced by the treatment and therefore
constitute bad controls according to the definition of Angrist and Pischke (2008).7 In
contrast to DiD, SCM is flexible in the sense that one can control for these factors using
only pre-treatment information. As a consequence, the resulting counterfactual will ac-
count for important pre-treatment socio-economic characteristics of countries’ which are
independent of the treatment.
Suppose that there are J+1 countries where j = 1 denotes the treated country – which,
in our case, corresponds to a binding emission target under the KP – and j = 2, . . . , J +1
are all untreated countries or US states in the donor pool. In addition, let T0 be the time
of treatment. For the treated country we have data about the actual emission path (Y1t),
but we are ignorant about the counterfactual emissions which would have occurred if this
country would not have been subject to the treatment (Y N1t for t > T0). Thus, we have to
find an estimate for Y N1t to obtain an estimate for the treatment effect α1t:
α1t = Y1t − Y N1t . (1)
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015) propose to
make use of the observed characteristics of the countries in the control group or donor pool.
7For example, investments to reduce GHG emissions may have an impact on GDP per capita, CO2
intensity, electricity production, etc.
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The underlying idea is to find weightsW = (ω2, ..., ωJ+1)
′, with ωj ≥ 0 for j = 2, . . . , J+1
and
∑J+1
j=2 ωj = 1, such that the weighted average of all countries in the donor pool
resembles the treated country with respect to GHG emissions in the pre-intervention
period and all other relevant aspects (Z).
Formally, we seek W such that:
J+1∑
j=2
ωjYjt = Y1t for all t < T0 and
J+1∑
j=2
ωjZj = Z1 . (2)
Then
∑J+1
j=2 ω

jYjt for t ≥ T0 is an estimate for the unobserved counterfactual emissions
path Y N1t inducing an estimate for the treatment effect:
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
ωjYjt , t ≥ T0 . (3)
In general, a vector W such that equations (2) hold may not exist (in particular, if there
are structural differences between treated countries and controls). However, one can choose
the weights such as to
min
W
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) , (4)
where X1 denotes a (k×1) vector of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated country,
which may include the pre-intervention emission path, and X0 denotes a (k×J) matrix of
the same variables for the J countries in the donor pool (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). The symmetric and positive definite matrix V weights the
relative importance of the various characteristics included in X. Obviously, the optimal
weights W depend on the weighting matrix V . We follow Abadie et al. (2010) in choosing
V by using a regression based method and equal weights. For further discussion on the
synthetic control method including several extensions, see Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie
et al. (2015).
In other words, we use SCM to create the specific counterfactual country for each
treated country via a convex combination of all units in the donor pool. To increase the
comparability of countries we normalize the outcome of interest (CO2 emissions) with the
year of treatment T0 as the base year (Cavallo et al., 2013).
Our set of predictors when using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool includes:
Several years of normalized (treatment year=1) CO2 emissions
8; the averages of two 5-year
8More specifically, we use 1981, 1983, 1985, ....
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periods prior to the treatment for all predictors (e.g., 1987-1991 and 1992-1996 for 1997
as treatment), i.e. GDP per capita, GDP growth, human capital index, life expectancy,
agricultural, industry and services value added and population growth; and the averages
for two sub-periods of the post-treatment periods (e.g., 2000 - 2005 and 2006-2010) for
life expectancy, human capital index and population growth. In doing so, we assume that
the latter three variables will not be affected by the treatment and, therefore, do not
constitute bad controls in the sense of Angrist and Pischke (2008).
Unfortunately, several of the above listed variables are not available for US states.
Thus, we rely on several years of normalized (treatment year=1) CO2 emissions, GDP
per capita, GDP growth, and population growth when using US states as the donor pool.
As we do expect differences in the classification and coding between country level and US
state level data, in particular for GDP, we use the changes rather then the levels (as for
non-Annex B countries) with respect to the treatment year values.9 More specifically, we
use normalized per capita GDP, GDP growth and population growth for, e.g., 1987–1991
and 1992–1996 and, in addition, population growth data for 2000–2005 and 2006–2010
(1997 as treatment year).
As the SCM does not provide classical standard errors to infer statistical significance,
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015) suggest to
run placebo or permutation tests. The underlying idea is to estimate counterfactual emis-
sion paths for regional entities in the donor pool, i.e., for regions without any treatment.
In an ideal world with the perfect analogue of the “treated” country being available in
the donor pool, we would find no treatment effects for all countries in the donor pool and
all post-treatment years, as the countries in the donor pool, i.e. the control group, did not
receive any treatment. However, in practice we will always find placebo treatment effects
to at least some extend. As a consequence, we only consider the actual treatment effect
to be statistically significant if it is significantly larger than the placebo treatment effects.
Our inference approach rests on a combination of two refinements of the classical
placebos studies that have been proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al.
(2015). First, we run a placebo treatment on all countries in the donor pool and select
the top 19 countries/US states in terms of pre-treatment root mean squared prediction
error (RMSPE) to avoid rejecting the significance of treatment effects on the basis of
outliers within the placebos studies. Second, we calculate the ratio between the treatment
effect (the root mean squared treatment effect) and the pre-treatment root mean squared
9We expect these differences to be constant over time and therefore focus on the changes in order to
eliminate any inconsistencies.
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prediction error (RMSPE) for all 20 countries (the top 19 countries from the placebo
treatment plus the treated country) for each year of the post-treatment period. For each
year of the post-treatment period, we then calculate a probability that resembles the
relative frequency that a randomly chosen country out of the 20 countries in the placebo
test has a RMSPE ratio that is at least as large than that of the treated country. We use
a combination of the two refinements as proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie
et al. (2015), as placebos with large pre-treatment RMSPE, i.e. a poor fit, are likely to
experience large placebo treatment effects in the post-treatment period and, therefore,
lead not only to (i) large treatment/placebo effects but also (ii) large RMSPE ratios.
Finally, we consider the treatment effect of the treated country for a particular post-
treatment year to be significant if none of the 19 countries with placebo treatments shows
a larger RMSPE ratio than the actual treated unit, i.e. the relative frequency of finding
such an effect by randomly drawing one out of the 20 countries is 1/20 = 0.05.
3.2 Data
We analyze the effect of being committed to an emission target under the KP for 15
major Western GHG emitters. Eastern European countries are excluded from the empir-
ical analysis due to data availability.10 The 15 treated countries under investigation are:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. With respect to GHG emis-
sions, these countries are responsible for approximately 50% of total 1990 GHG emissions
of the countries with binding emission targets under the KP. In order to reduce the im-
balance in country characteristics between Annex B and non-Annex B countries as much
as possible, we restrict the country level control group to countries being classified as high
income and upper middle income countries by the World Bank.
The data used in the empirical analysis stem from several different sources. Data on
country-level CO2 emissions, value added for agriculture, industry and services, GDP
growth, life expectancy and population growth are taken from the World Development
Indicators published by the World Bank. GDP per capita and the human capital index
originate from the Penn World Tables published by the University of Groningen. Addi-
tional information on the KP (list of Annex B countries with targets) stems from the
10Moreover, at the time of adoption of the KP in 1997, Eastern European countries exhibited emission
levels far below their emission targets due to the severe economic downturn during the 1990s which
followed the breakdown of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). As these countries were not expected to reach
emission levels at or even above their Kyoto targets in the near future – despite their economic recovery
–, they had little economic incentives to reduce emissions.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N P-values
Annex B countries (under investigation)
GDP per capita 23439.94 5485.69 10401.74 43569.25 165
GDP growth 2.15 2.09 -6.51 7.60 165
Human Capital Index 2.77 0.29 2.19 3.3 165
Life Expectancy 76.85 1.31 73.67 80.42 165
Agri. value added∗ 3.52 1.82 1.22 13.93 165
Ind. Value added∗ 31.05 3.1 23.56 38.41 165
Serv. valued added∗ 65.42 3.21 58.46 73.23 165
Population growth 0.48 0.39 -0.22 1.78 165
High income and upper middle income Non-Annex B countries+
GDP per capita 10857.28 10709.68 335.49 67883.89 694 0.00
GDP growth 2.13 7.50 -42.62 90.88 813 0.07
Human Capital Index 2.36 0.37 1.68 3.52 511 0.00
Life Expectancy 69.83 5.99 40.97 80.13 823 0.00
Agri. value added∗ 11.24 10.21 0.00 67.38 687 0.00
Ind. Value added∗ 33.20 12.64 8.02 74.67 678 0.13
Serv. valued added∗ 55.49 14.21 8.24 90.63 679 0.00
Population growth 1.81 1.70 -6.49 16.51 994 0.00
US states
GDP per capita 27514.78 9703.95 15468 87544 561 0.03
GDP growth 1.98 2.57 -12.90 11.90 561 0.00
Population growth 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.07 561 0.00
Note: Descriptive statistics for each (sub-)sample and the 11 years (1987–1997) prior to the treatment, i.e. the adoption of
the KP. The p-values in the last column are based on t-tests for the equality of means between Annex B countries and the
two potential control groups.
∗: in % of GDP, +: not sufficient data available for some non-Annex countries, i.e. they are not part of the donor pool.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). US state level
information on CO2 emissions is taken from the US Energy Information Administration
(EIA), real GDP per capita and GDP growth stem from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) and population data is based on the Population Estimates Program (PEP) of the
United States Census Bureau. Unfortunately, data on the remaining predictors (human
capital index, life expectancy, etc.) are not readily available at the US state level. In order
to avoid any problems caused by potential inconsistencies in the classification of country
and US state level data, we only use changes over time for the available predictors when
using US states as a control group in the later analysis. Table 1 shows the summary
statistics for all data used in the empirical analysis.11
11Although CO2 data for US states is available until 2012, there is still no consistent information for
CO2 emissions of Annex B countries after 2010. We are therefore – in principle – able to estimate the
counterfactual emission path until 2012, i.e. until the end of the first commitment period but do not have
11
Figure 2: Synthetic Control for Canada based on
a) non-Annex B countries
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b) US states
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Note: Actual and synthetic CO2 emission path for Canada. The solid line stands for the actual Canadian CO2 emissions
whereas the dashed line represents the synthetic Canada, i.e. the counterfactual emission path, based on non-Annex B
country data (left) and US state level data (right). N is the number of countries in the donor pool used for the placebo
studies and we display the figures for the pre-treatment RMSPE. The numbers underneath the lines indicate the treatment
effects in percent and the corresponding probabilities in parenthesis (see section 3.1).
Table 1 clearly shows the predictor imbalance for Annex B, non-Annex B countries
and US states for the 11 years prior to the adoption of the KP, i.e. 1987–1997. As discussed
earlier, it is evident that there is a statistically significant difference for most predictors
(except industry value added) between the two groups of countries. Moreover, there is also
a significant difference between Annex B countries and US states. However, in contrast to
non-Annex B countries per capita GDP is actually higher and population growth lower
(on average) for US states than for Annex B countries. GDP growth, however, is very
similar for all groups in the period of 1987–1997.
3.3 Results
In the following, we report the results for the two different specifications, where either
selected non-Annex B countries or US states act as non-treated control entities from which
we construct the counterfactual CO2 emission paths of the 15 Annex B countries under
investigation. We consider ratification as the treatment event.
As a representative example, Figure 2 shows the normalized CO2 emissions path of
Canada (solid line) and its synthetic counterfactuals (dashed line) based on non-Annex B
countries (left) and US states (right). We observe that for both specifications the synthetic
information on the actual emissions of Annex B countries to estimate the treatment effect.
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controls for Canada matches actual CO2 emissions very well in the pre-treatment period
(up to 2002). This is also evident from the small RMSPE values of 0.0452 and 0.0436. Also
the general pattern of counterfactual emissions in the post treatment period (after 2002),
i.e. the CO2 emissions Canada had if it were not subject to a binding emission target under
the KP, is similar for both specifications. Actual CO2 are slightly above the counterfactual
emissions during the post treatment period. However, we do observe slight differences
between the two specifications. US state level data predicts lower counterfactual CO2
emissions of Canada in the post treatment period. In fact, the treatment effect ranges
from -3% to +3% for non-Annex B countries and -5% to +13% for US state level data.
Note that a positive (negative) number indicates actual emissions are higher (lower) than
the emissions of the synthetic control. Thus, a treatment effect in the sense that countries
with a binding emission target under the KP experience lower actual emissions than
predicted by their counterfactuals would result in negative numbers.
As an indicator of significance, the values in parenthesis give the probabilities that if
one randomly draws one country out of the 20 countries in the placebo study (the top
19 non treated countries with respect to low RMSPE in the pre-treatment period plus
the treated country) one would draw a country that exhibits at least as high a deviation
from their actual normalized CO2 emissions than the treated country. We do not find any
significant effects both when using non-Annex B country level data and US state level
data to construct counterfactual emissions. Thus, we do not find any evidence that the
adoption of binding emission targets under the KP had any significant CO2 emissions
reduction effect for Canada.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results for all 15 Annex B countries under investigation
and for the two model specifications (using non-Annex B countries and US states in the
donor pool). The numbers indicate the deviation of the actual normalized CO2 emissions
from its synthetic counterfactuals, i.e. the numbers for Canada are identical to the numbers
shown in Figure 2. Likewise, numbers in parenthesis show probabilities as discussed in
section 3.1 and, thus, reflect the statistical significance of the effect.12
For the specification using non-Annex B countries to construct counterfactual CO2
emissions (Table 2), we find few negative treatment effects being mostly in single digits
with the biggest effect for Portugal (-17%) in the years 2006, 2008 and 2009. None of the
negative effects are statistically significant (corresponding to a probability of 0.05). How-
ever, we do find quite substantial positive effects for several countries including Austria,
12Analogous graphs to Figure 2 for all countries and both specifications and the placebo studies to
infer statistical significance are in the Appendix (Figures 5–8).
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Table 2: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B Countries
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.05 .12 .02
(.38) (.69) (.92)
RMSPE: 0.0741
Austria
.06 .27 .24 .23 .25 .36 .39 .22 .53
(.45) (.10) (.25) (.25) (.25) (.20) (.25) (.55) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0858
Belgium
-.05 .13 .09 .04 .03 .11 .08 .08 .26
(.50) (.35) (.50) (.90) (.85) (.80) (.75) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1210
Canada
.03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .02 -.03
(.50) (.60) (.55) (.80) (.85) (.90) (.95) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0452
Finland
.11 .33 .29 .01 .26 .34 .18 .10 .41
(.15) (.05) (.10) (1.0) (.10) (.20) (.55) (.70) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1032
France
-.01 .21 .27 .23 .23 .46 .42 .29 .55
(.90) (.10) (.25) (.30) (.35) (.20) (.25) (.45) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1607
Germany
-.04 .04 .03 -.01 .02 .05 .06 .02 .06
(.60) (.75) (.80) (1.0) (.90) (.90) (.85) (.90) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.1443
Great Britain
-.01 .20 .21 .16 .20 .45 .45 .25 .54
(.90) (.15) (.40) (.50) (.40) (.20) (.25) (.55) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1130
Italy
.05 .20 .22 .16 .21 .38 .39 .18 .39
(.60) (.10) (.35) (.50) (.35) (.20) (.25) (.60) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0935
Japan
.04 .09 .12 .07 .09 .14 .13 .05 .15
(.60) (.45) (.45) (.70) (.65) (.60) (.60) (.80) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0664
Netherlands
.04 .15 .18 .12 .11 .24 .27 .24 .43
(.60) (.20) (.40) (.50) (.55) (.45) (.40) (.55) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0885
Norway
-.08 .06 .04 .02 .09 .06 .21 .20 .46
(.30) (.70) (.75) (1.0) (.60) (.90) (.40) (.55) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0952
Portugal
.11 .00 -.07 -.08 -.17 -.10 -.17 -.17 -.15
(.15) (.95) (.50) (.50) (.30) (.70) (.40) (.55) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0461
Spain
.08 .03 .09 .10 .11 .13 .05 -.05 -.08
(.30) (.75) (.45) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.85) (.80) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0916
Sweden
.11 .13 .14 .06 .04 .08 .11 .00 .26
(.15) (.20) (.40) (.80) (.85) (.90) (.65) (1.0) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1931
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment. For
each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in
parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
14
Table 3: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.05 .12 .10
(.15) (.10) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0769
Austria
.07 .10 .06 .05 .14 .07 .11 .20 .33
(.15) (.05) (.15) (.35) (.10) (.30) (.20) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0513
Belgium
-.03 -.00 -.06 -.12 -.03 -.10 -.04 .19 .29
(.40) (.85) (.15) (.05) (.35) (.20) (.55) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1063
Canada
.04 -.03 -.05 .11 .12 .13 .12 .13
(.20) (.25) (.20) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0436
Finland
.12 .22 .15 -.10 .22 .15 .06 .21 .45
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.40) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0881
France
.01 -.01 -.00 -.04 .02 -.04 .00 .28 .33
(.90) (.70) (.85) (.40) (.55) (.55) (.95) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1164
Germany
-.05 .01 -.02 -.03 .15 .08 .17 .09 .07
(.25) (.80) (.45) (.60) (.10) (.35) (.10) (.25) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0454
Great Britain
-.01 -.03 -.04 -.08 .02 -.05 -.01 .17 .25
(.90) (.45) (.25) (.15) (.60) (.50) (.95) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0586
Italy
.05 .04 .01 -.03 .10 .05 .06 .12 .18
(.25) (.30) (.80) (.55) (.20) (.50) (.45) (.20) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0454
Japan
.01 .04 .04 .03 .03 .01 -.02 -.08 -.04
(.85) (.40) (.25) (.60) (.40) (.85) (.65) (.25) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0214
Netherlands
.05 .04 .04 -.01 .03 .03 .10 .29 .39
(.30) (.40) (.25) (.70) (.35) (.65) (.20) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0598
Norway
-.04 .05 -.01 -.06 .14 .14 .32 .39 .77
(.35) (.25) (.80) (.20) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1022
Portugal
.15 -.00 -.06 -.07 .02 .04 .02 .04 .00
(.05) (.95) (.15) (.20) (.70) (.60) (.70) (.65) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0803
Spain
.13 .10 .07 .07 .26 .29 .21 .12 .11
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.20) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.15) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0709
Sweden
.12 .08 .07 -.01 .06 -.02 .08 .17 .41
(.05) (.10) (.15) (.80) (.25) (.80) (.40) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1120
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states to
construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of treatment. For each country,
we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis.
Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands and Norway. At the same time,
we only find a significant positive treatment effect (+33%) for Finland in the year 2003.
When looking at the specification using US state level data to construct counterfactual
CO2 emissions (Table 3), the general pattern is that effects tend to be smaller in magnitude
but are more often statistically significant. As a result, we do now find a statistically
significant negative effect for Belgium in 2005 (-12%). In line with our findings based
on non-Annex B countries, however, we find more pronounced positive effects. There are
positive and significant effects for Austria (2 years), Belgium (1 year), Finland (6 years),
France (2 years), Great Britain (1 year), The Netherlands (2 years), Norway (4 years),
Portugal (1 year), Spain (5 years) and Sweden (2 years).13
In summary, we do not find any evidence that a binding emission target under the
KP induced a significant and persistent emission reduction effect for Annex B countries
with binding emission targets under the KP, although we do find significant negative
effects for one country in one year (of the nine year post treatment period) in one of
our specifications.14 This finding is further illustrated in Figure 3 showing the average
normalized CO2 emissions of the Annex B countries under investigation (solid line) and the
average counterfactual CO2 emissions path (dashed line) based on non-Annex B countries
(left) and US states (right). We observe that the average counterfactual CO2 emissions
path fits the average actual emissions path quite well not only in the pre-treatment but
also in the post treatment period. If at all, we find that actual emissions are higher
(not lower!) than the counterfactual GHG emissions, i.e. the synthetic controls based on
comparable countries and US states from the control group.
When comparing Figures 3 and 1 it is also evident that the synthetic control method
successfully balanced the pre-treatment trends, i.e. the opposing trends between Annex
B and non-Annex B countries, as shown in Figure 1, vanished entirely in Figure 3.
3.4 Robustness Checks
For all countries under investigation we consider the ratification of the KP as the time
of treatment. However, as the emission targets were already known in 1997, it might be
that the adoption of the KP already induced changes in the emission paths of treated
13Given the importance of Delaware and Nevada for many treated countries (see Table 5 in the Ap-
pendix), we estimated an alternative specification excluding both states from the donor pool. Again, the
results look very much the same as the baseline specification above with a significant negative effect only
for Portugal in 2010, which also shows a considerably larger RMSPE.
14However, we do find significant and persistent positive treatment effects for Finland, Norway and
Spain (positive treatment effects in four or more years out of the 9 year post treatment period).
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Figure 3: Average actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for synthetic controls based on
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Note: The solid line represents the (average) normalized (treatment year=1) CO2 emission of the Annex B countries under
investigation. The dashed line line indicates the average normalized emissions of the synthetic controls for the treated
countries based on non-Annex B countries (left) and US states (right).
countries. In fact, we consider 1997 as the earliest time at which the KP could have
imposed a treatment effect. As a consequence, we run an additional specification, where
we assume 1997 as the year of treatment. This robustness check could also be interpreted
as a placebo in time analysis (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).
Results are shown in Tables 6 and 7, and Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix and are
very similar to our main specification. We do not find any significant treatment effects
using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool and hardly find any significant negative
treatment effects when using states in the donor pool (Finland and The Netherlands in
the year 2000 being the only exception). Again, we do find some positive treatment effects,
in particular for Norway and Spain.
Although an Annex B country might have known its emission reduction target under
the KP already in 1997, a country might not have taken any action to reduce its GHG
emissions prior to the date the KP entered into force, even if the country has ratified
the KP before. Of course, this does not invalidate the analysis when choosing ratification
or even adoption as the time of treatment. If the synthetic counterfactual matches the
country under consideration well, all we should see is that counterfactual emissions start
to deviate from actual emissions not at the considered time of treatment but at some
later time at which emission reduction efforts started. Yet, taking too early a treatment
date comes at the disadvantage that fewer pre-treatment periods of data are available
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to construct the synthetic counterfactuals which might result in a poorer match between
actual country and synthetic counterfactual. As a consequence, we run an additional spec-
ification were we consider 2004 as the time of treatment, because subsequent to Russia’s
ratification in November 2004 the KP entered into force in February 2005. Results are
shown in Table 8, and Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix and are highly consistent with
the results of our two main specifications.
For the 15 Annex B countries investigated we do find very little evidence for a persistent
treatment effect, i.e. a permanent reduction in CO2 emissions compared to their synthetic
counterfactuals no matter what time we consider as the time of treatment. One reason for
this might be that CO2 emission levels are strongly correlated with economic performance
and, thus, are vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations. In other words, favorable global
economic conditions for Annex B countries (at least up to 2007) could be responsible for
the lack of a significant effect on emission levels although Annex B countries might have
invested in cleaner production technologies. We test this hypothesis by running alternative
specifications with CO2 intensity (CO2 emissions relative to GDP) and CO2 emissions per
capita as dependent variables, again using non-Annex B country and US state level data
to construct counterfactuals for the 15 Annex B countries under consideration.15 Tables
9–11 in the Appendix show the results of these alternative model specifications. Our
findings are very consistent with our main specifications. We do not find any significant
treatment effects for CO2 intensity, and only find significant positive treatment effects in
case of CO2 emissions per capita.
We excluded Eastern European countries from the analysis for two reasons. First, we
have insufficient data for most of these countries to construct proper synthetic counter-
factuals. Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 the whole former “Eastern
Block” experienced a severe economic downturn. Economic downturns are accompanied
with lower production and, as a consequence, lower energy use and reduced CO2 emissions.
In fact, the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) had a significant impact on these
countries’ CO2 emissions that is likely to blur any additional emission reductions due to
binding emission targets under the KP.16 To show this, we investigate the effect of the
treatment “collapse of the FSU” on the CO2 emissions of Poland.
17 Again, we construct
15Due to a discontinuity in US state level data for GDP between 1997 and 1998 we are not able to use
US states in the donor pool for CO2 intensity.
16Despite their economic recovery, Eastern European countries exhibited emission levels far below their
emission targets at the time of adoption of the KP in 1997. As these countries were not expected to reach
emission levels at or even above their Kyoto targets in the near future, they had little economic incentives
to reduce emissions.
17Poland being one of the few Eastern European countries with sufficient data on CO2 emissions prior
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Figure 4: Poland’s actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for synthetic controls based on
a) non-Annex B countries
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Note: Actual normalized (1989=1) CO2 emissions (solid line) and synthetic control (dashed line) for Poland considering
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 as the treatment using non-Annex B country data (left) and US state level data to
construct synthetic counterfactuals. The country weights for the synthetic control are Barbados (0.138), Fiji (0.08), Korea
(0.031), Sri Lanka (0.209), Trinidad and Tobago (0.143), USA (0.193), and Vietnam (0.172) for non-Annex B countries and
Illinois (0.565) and Rhode Island (0.435) for US states in the donor pool.
a synthetic counterfactual Poland (again using non-Annex B countries and US states)
and compare the deviations of normalized CO2 emissions. Figure 4 shows the results. We
observe that starting from the time of the treatment in 1989 actual normalized CO2 emis-
sions in Poland increasingly fall short of the normalized CO2 emissions of its synthetic
counterfactual. As already seen in Section 3.3, this deviation is more pronounced but less
significant using non-Annex B countries compared to US states in the donor pool. We
observe a significant treatment effect at the end of the investigation period (year 2000)
for synthetic controls based on non-Annex B countries and a highly significant treatment
effect throughout the whole post treatment period for synthetic controls based on US
states.
4 Discussion
We analyzed the effectiveness of the KP with respect to its primary goal – the reduction of
domestic GHG emissions in the industrialized world – for 15 Western Annex B countries.
Both in our two main specifications and in the various robustness checks we performed,
we only find very little evidence for a significant and persistent emission reduction effect
to 1990.
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in any of the 15 major western Annex B countries under investigation. At the same
time, we do find some evidence that some Annex B countries performed even worse than
comparable countries from the two donor pools. On average, the CO2 emissions of the
15 countries are rather above than below their synthetic controls (see Figure 3). This
stands in contrast to three recent empirical studies (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012, 2013;
Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso, 2015) that consistently find, on average, substantial
(7–10%) and significant CO2 emission reductions attributable to the adoption of binding
emission targets under the KP.
Our results show the importance of addressing a number of empirical challenges when
estimating the effect of international environmental policies in general, and the Kyoto
Protocol in particular. The key to identifying the “true” treatment effect is the availability
and the selection of appropriate controls. In order to do so, our empirical strategy differs
from the previous studies in three important aspects.
First, we employ the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie
et al., 2010, 2015). SCM enables us to construct counterfactual emissions paths for all
15 countries under investigation that reasonably match the observed emissions in the
pre-treatment period (as is evident from the small root mean square prediction errors
shown in Tables 2 and 3). This is possible because the treatment effects can be estimated
for each country individually, which allows to individually identify the counterfactual
synthetic country to the idiosyncrasies of each treated country, such as different country
characteristics, emission paths, targets and ratification dates.18
Second, using non-Annex B country data to construct counterfactual CO2 emission
paths for the investigated Annex B countries may be problematic because of (i) irrec-
oncilable structural differences between Annex B and non-Annex B countries including
opposing pre-treatment emission paths and (ii) a bias resulting from the use of the flexi-
bility mechanisms blurring the distinction between treated and non-treated countries. To
circumvent these problems we run a second specification using US state level data to con-
struct synthetic counterfactuals. Although US state level data comes at the disadvantage
that data on some covariates is not available, it seems to be preferable to using non-Annex
B country data on the ground that pre-treatment matching is considerably better (as is
evident from comparing the root mean square prediction errors in Tables 2 and 3).
Third, we discard all Eastern European countries from the analysis. We consider this
justified, as the former “Eastern Block” experienced a severe economic downturn after
18In fact, Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix show that the countries/regions drawn from the donor pool
to construct the counterfactual country differ considerably for the 15 investigated countries.
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the collapse of the Former Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. Even after their
economic recovery, former CO2 emission levels were not reached and, at the time of the
adoption of the KP, it was evident that many Eastern European countries were subject
to GHG emission targets that were unlikely to be binding (also known as “hot air”).
As a consequence, these countries had no incentive to reduce GHG emissions in the
first place. Nevertheless, the collapse of the FSU had a significant negative impact on
the CO2 emissions of the Eastern European countries. Incorporating these countries into
the treated sample when eliciting the average treatment effect of the treated may bias
the result in favor of a negative significant effect if one is not able to control for the
peculiarities of those countries in particular with respect to development of CO2 emission
in the early 90s. In fact, we conjecture that considering Eastern European countries is
at least partly responsible for both the size and the significance of the treatment effects
reported in Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) and Grunewald
and Martinez-Zarzoso (2015).
Our results have strong political implications. Despite the persistent experience of
failed negotiations on a successor of the KP for almost a decade, the international com-
munity seems to insist on a “Kyoto Protocol XXL”, i.e. a treaty similar to the KP but
also including binding emission reduction targets for some of the former non-Annex B
countries, in particular, countries in transition such as China, India, Brazil etc. Recent
empirical evidence seems to support such an approach, as these studies find that – at
least in average – binding emission targets under the KP induced a considerable (7–10%)
and statistically significant CO2 reduction effect. According to our results, the KP had no
verifiable effect on the CO2 emissions of ratifying Annex B countries. As a consequence,
we are pessimistic that a potential successor of the KP resting on the same principles –
even if it would be adopted in the first place – had any discernible effect on the reduc-
tion of global GHG emissions. In fact, bilateral or smaller multilateral emission reduction
agreements, where commitment is in the best interest of all participating countries, may
achieve more (Carbone et al., 2009).
5 Conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) has been widely criticized by the public press and the scientific
community alike. In particular, issues concerning equity, efficiency and cost-effectiveness
have been raised. In this paper, we asked in how far the KP lived up to its primary
goal, the reduction of domestic GHG emissions in the industrialized world. To answer this
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question, we analyzed the development of CO2 emissions for major GHG emitters with
binding emission targets under the KP by employing the synthetic control method. We
find very little evidence for a significant emission reduction effect for all 15 investigated
countries, i.e. countries with binding emissions targets did not emit less CO2 over the
period from 1998–2010 than they would have had were they not subject to GHG emission
targets under the KP.
More general, we argue that the empirical challenges faced in the present paper apply
to many international environmental policies that can only be evaluated at the country
level. Countries tend to be highly heterogeneous with significant differences in their (socio-
)economic and political characteristics. As a result, there are numerous issues that need
to be addressed, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Accounting for all of these challenges
simultaneously can be difficult when employing standard panel data analysis. For example,
in many cases one has to deal with non-random selection into treatment, a violation of the
common trend assumption and the presence of bad controls among important covariates.
The synthetic matching method may be better suited to address these challenges than
standard panel data approaches.
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A Appendix
A.1 Ratification of the KP as the treatment event
Table 4: Weights for using non-Annex B countries in the donor pool
Australia: Hong Kong (0.299), South Korea (0.211), USA (0.489)
Austria: Albania (0.085), Brunei Darussalam (0.026), Macao (0.273), Malta (0.062), Singapore (0.366), USA (0.188),
Belgium: Albania (0.089), Macao (0.024), Malta (0.067), Singapore (0.382), Uruguay (0.068), USA (0.37)
Canada: Albania (0.05), Malta (0.249), USA (0.647)
Finland: Albania (0.103), Macao (0.132), Malta (0.213), Singapore (0.305), Uruguay (0.051),
USA (0.196
France: Albania (0.15), Macao (0.06), Singapore (0.597), USA (0.246)
Germany: Albania (0.132), Gabon (0.015), Singapore (0.29), USA (0.564)
Great Britain: Albania (0.13), Gabon (0.018), Macao (0.171), Singapore (0.55), USA (0.131),
Italy: Albania (0.086), Macao (0.215), Malta (0.18), Singapore (0.415), USA (0.104)
Japan: Malta (0.306), Singapore (0.212), USA (0.483)
Netherlands: Albania (0.08), Malta (0.139), Singapore (0.353), USA (0.428)
Norway: Albania (0.01), Brunei Darussalam (0. 067), Macao (0.054), Malta (0.03), Singapore (0.05), USA (0.788)
Portugal: Costa Rica (0.182), Macao (0.481), Malta (0.014), Cyprus (0.05), Mauritius (0.041), Thailand (0.049)
Tunesia (0.024), Uruguay (0.208)
Spain: Albania (0.053), Cyprus (0.373), Macao (0.149), Malta (0.283), Singapore (0.039), USA (0.103)
Sweden: Albania (0.147), Singapore (0.295), USA (0.558)
Note: Country Weights for Results in Table 2. The countries in the donor pool, i.e. countries that may receive positive
weights, include all non-Annex B countries with sufficient data except for countries classified as low income according to
the World Bank. More specifically, the donor pool/control group consists of (ISO 3 country codes): ALB, ARG, BHR, BLZ,
BRA, BRB, BRN, BWA, CHL, CHN, CO, CRI, CYP, DOM, ECU, FJI, GAB, IRN, JOR, KOR, MAC, MEX, MLT, MUS,
MYS, PAN, PER, SAU, SGP, THA, TTO, TUN, TUR, URY, USA, VEN, and ZAF.
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Figure 5: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for non-Annex B countries in donor pool
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Figure 6: Placebo studies for non-Annex B countries in donor pool
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Table 5: Weights for using US states in the Donor Pool
Australia: Arizona (0.224), Nevada (0.776)
Austria: Delaware (0.48), Nevada (0.486), Texas (0.034)
Belgium: Delaware (0.636), Nevada (0.364)
Canada: Delaware (0.101), District of Columbia (0.171), Nevada (0.727)
Finland: Delaware (0.541), Nevada (0.418), Texas (0.042)
France: Arizona (0.007), Delaware (0.868), Nevada (0.125)
Germany: District of Columbia (0.82), Ohio (0.18)
Great Britain: Delaware (0.773), Nevada (0.227)
Italy: Delaware (0.454), Nevada (0.546)
Japan: Idaho (0.093), Loisiana (0.146), Michigan (0.176), North Dakota (0.033),
Oregon (0.004), Rhode Island (0.112), South Dakota (0.323), Utah (0.101)
Netherlands: Delaware (0.53), Nevada (0.21), Texas (0.26)
Norway: Delaware (0.291), Nevada (0.709)
Portugal: Nevada (1.0)
Spain: Delware (0.071), Nevada (0.929)
Sweden: Arizona (0.029), Delaware (0.629), District of Columbia (0.342),
Note: US state Weights for Results in Table 3. All US states are included in the donor pool, i.e. may receive positive weights.
Given the importance of Delaware and Nevada for many Annex B countries we performed a robustness check excluding
both states from the donor pool. Results are almost identical with no evidence for a permament emission reduction effect.
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Figure 7: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for US states in donor pool
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Figure 8: Placebo studies for US states in donor pool
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A.2 Adoption of the KP as the treatment event
Table 6: Treatment in 1997: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B
countries
Country
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.03 -.05 -.07 -.08 -.04 -.06 -.05 -.02 .00 -.01 .03 .11 .05
(.75) (.70) (.55) (.65) (.80) (.70) (.80) (.80) (1.0) (1.0) (.85) (.70) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0350
Austria
.06 .01 -.01 .01 .05 .14 .15 .16 .11 .03 -.05 -.10 .04
(.60) (.95) (1.0) (.90) (.75) (.55) (.45) (.50) (.60) (1.0) (.85) (.75) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0867
Belgium
.05 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.07 .01 -.04 -.08 -.11 -.10 -.16 -.13 -.03
(.65) (.85) (.95) (.90) (.70) (1.0) (.80) (.60) (.60) (.85) (.60) (.70) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.1064
Canada
.12 .10 .13 .10 .09 .20 .19 .20 .19 .25 .24 .21 .19
(.25) (.45) (.30) (.55) (.70) (.40) (.30) (.35) (.45) (.45) (.50) (.70) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0485
Finland
-.01 -.08 -.12 -.07 .03 .16 .12 -.11 .07 -.00 -.17 -.19 .00
(.80) (.45) (.30) (.70) (.80) (.55) (.50) (.55) (.65) (1.0) (.55) (.60) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0910
France
.19 .04 .03 .06 .03 .15 .19 .16 .17 .28 .26 .19 .30
(.10) (.85) (.70) (.85) (.80) (.55) (.35) (.55) (.50) (.55) (.55) (.70) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.1807
Germany
.06 -.06 -.04 -.05 -.10 -.09 -.08 -.13 -.09 -.10 -.09 -.12 -.11
(.60) (.55) (.65) (.80) (.70) (.65) (.60) (.55) (.65) (.85) (.80) (.70) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.1193
Great Britain
.00 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.09 -.07 -.06 -.08 -.08 -.14 -.21 -.26 -.17
(.95) (.55) (.60) (.80) (.70) (.70) (.80) (.60) (.65) (.55) (.40) (.40) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0998
Italy
.08 .06 .06 .03 .04 .10 .17 .13 .14 .10 .03 -.06 .03
(.30) (.65) (.60) (.85) (.80) (.60) (.40) (.55) (.60) (.85) (.85) (.90) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0859
Japan
.04 .05 .09 .03 .06 .08 .10 .06 .08 .11 .10 .04 .11
(.70) (.75) (.50) (.90) (.75) (.70) (.60) (.70) (.65) (.85) (.80) (.95) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0590
Netherlands
-.03 -.09 -.10 -.09 -.08 -.09 -.07 -.11 -.14 -.13 -.14 -.12 -.03
(.75) (.45) (.30) (.55) (.70) (.60) (.70) (.55) (.50) (.55) (.60) (.70) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0778
Norway
.08 .20 .07 .15 .04 .20 .19 .18 .26 .17 .32 .32 .59
(.35) (.20) (.55) (.50) (.75) (.35) (.30) (.45) (.30) (.55) (.35) (.30) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0680
Portugal
.07 .16 .14 .12 .18 .09 .06 .07 -.08 -.12 -.23 -.19 -.23
(.45) (.25) (.25) (.50) (.40) (.65) (.80) (.60) (.65) (.55) (.40) (.50) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0593
Spain
.17 .20 .31 .22 .31 .36 .46 .47 .49 .56 .46 .29 .24
(.10) (.20) (.10) (.25) (.25) (.20) (.10) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.25) (.50) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.1025
Sweden
.04 -.07 -.11 -.10 -.02 -.08 -.08 -.14 -.15 -.18 -.16 -.22 -.06
(.70) (.45) (.30) (.50) (.85) (.65) (.60) (.50) (.45) (.55) (.60) (.55) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.1608
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 1997 (the year of adoption of the KP) as the
time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of
finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Figure 9: Treatment in 1997: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions using non-Annex B
countries in the donor pool
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Table 7: Treatment in 1997: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on US states
Country
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.01 -.05 -.05 -.04 .03 .04 .02 .04 .11 .09 .17 .27 .18
(.75) (.25) (.35) (.50) (.55) (.65) (.65) (.55) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.05) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0212
Austria
-.03 -.09 -.07 -.03 .02 .09 .07 .09 .09 -.01 .01 .02 .09
(.35) (.10) (.15) (.50) (.75) (.30) (.40) (.35) (.30) (.95) (1.0) (.95) (.45)
RMSPE: 0.0433
Belgium
.01 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.09 -.05 -.07 -.11 -.10 -.16 -.13 -.04 -.03
(.85) (.60) (.40) (.75) (.25) (.55) (.40) (.20) (.25) (.20) (.30) (.85) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0580
Canada
.05 .02 .03 .04 .04 .09 .05 .07 .04 .03 .03 .07 .02
(.20) (.60) (.60) (.45) (.55) (.25) (.40) (.35) (.40) (.65) (.65) (.70) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0172
Finland
-.04 -.06 -.11 -.03 .06 .14 .11 -.10 .15 .10 .02 .01 .17
(.25) (.20) (.05) (.55) (.50) (.05) (.20) (.25) (.20) (.30) (.95) (.95) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0656
France
.10 -.00 -.05 .04 .01 .05 .05 .06 .15 .11 .16 .17 .14
(.10) (.90) (.25) (.50) (.95) (.55) (.50) (.50) (.20) (.30) (.30) (.25) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.0799
Germany
.01 -.02 -.06 .01 -.04 .03 -.00 -.00 .19 .12 .22 .12 .11
(.75) (.55) (.15) (.85) (.55) (.80) (1.0) (.95) (.20) (.30) (.25) (.50) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0468
Great Britain
.02 -.01 -.01 .05 -.01 -.01 .01 -.02 .02 -.04 .00 .20 .22
(.70) (.75) (.85) (.35) (.95) (1.0) (.90) (.60) (.70) (.65) (1.0) (.25) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0495
Italy
-.03 -.06 -.04 -.02 -.02 .01 .01 -.01 .00 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.05
(.45) (.20) (.40) (.70) (.75) (.90) (1.0) (.95) (.90) (.55) (.55) (.80) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0254
Japan
-.09 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.06 -.04 -.06 -.09 -.09 -.12 -.12 -.17 -.14
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.30) (.35) (.60) (.40) (.35) (.30) (.25) (.30) (.15) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.0175
Netherlands
-.06 -.10 -.10 -.06 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.08 -.04 .00 .06
(.15) (.10) (.05) (.35) (.55) (.90) (.60) (.45) (.30) (.30) (.65) (.95) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0408
Norway
.06 .19 .09 .21 .04 .21 .18 .18 .29 .29 .55 .58 .86
(.15) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.55) (.05) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0590
Portugal
.05 .18 .12 .14 .24 .12 .10 .11 .06 .09 .10 .13 .04
(.20) (.05) (.05) (.20) (.05) (.10) (.20) (.20) (.35) (.30) (.30) (.30) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0742
Spain
.04 .09 .07 .12 .20 .20 .22 .26 .37 .37 .25 .14 .06
(.35) (.10) (.15) (.20) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.25) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0406
Sweden
.01 -.03 -.07 .03 .07 .07 .07 .01 .04 -.02 .06 .08 .20
(.80) (.45) (.15) (.50) (.35) (.45) (.40) (.95) (.60) (.85) (.50) (.75) (.20)
RMSPE: 0.1488
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using US states to
construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 1997 (the year of adoption of the KP) as the time of
treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding
such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Figure 10: Treatment in 1997: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions using US states in the
donor pool
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A.3 KP’s entering into force as the treatment event
Table 8: Treatment in 2004: Estimates for Treatment Effects based on non-Annex B
Countries
Country
non-Annex B countries US states
Year Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
-.01 .01 .01 .04 .12 .07 .04 .08 .08 .14 .23 .14
(.95) (1.0) (.95) (.75) (.65) (.85) (.40) (.10) (.20) (.05) (.05) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0372 RMSPE: 0.0237
Austria
.10 .09 -.01 -.03 -.08 .01 .08 .06 .01 .02 .05 .08
(.45) (.50) (.95) (.85) (.75) (1.0) (.15) (.20) (.85) (.70) (.65) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0948 RMSPE: 0.0436
Belgium
-.08 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.06 .01 -.11 -.11 -.16 -.10 -.02 -.02
(.55) (.55) (.70) (.75) (.80) (1.0) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.15) (.80) (.80)
RMSPE: 0.1215 RMSPE: 0.0551
Canada
.13 .10 .13 .10 .08 .08 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.05
(.35) (.45) (.55) (.65) (.75) (.85) (.20) (.20) (.30) (.65) (.95) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0617 RMSPE: 0.0228
Finland
-.12 .07 -.01 -.14 -.16 .01 -.19 .02 -.01 -.10 -.07 .07
(.35) (.55) (.95) (.50) (.50) (1.0) (.05) (.60) (.85) (.15) (.40) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.0962 RMSPE: 0.0664
France
.09 .08 .15 .10 .05 .16 .06 .15 .10 .16 .18 .15
(.55) (.55) (.55) (.75) (.80) (.60) (.20) (.05) (.20) (.10) (.10) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.1589 RMSPE: 0.0728
Germany
-.09 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.09 -.05 -.01 .19 .12 .22 .12 .10
(.50) (.65) (.80) (.85) (.75) (.90) (.95) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.20) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1089 RMSPE: 0.0426
Great Britain
.00 .04 .01 -.01 -.09 -.01 -.02 .07 -.00 .04 .07 .10
(.95) (.70) (.95) (.90) (.75) (1.0) (.75) (.20) (1.0) (.65) (.45) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1013 RMSPE: 0.0293
Italy
.12 .13 .14 .09 -.02 .06 .01 .02 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.05
(.40) (.40) (.55) (.75) (.95) (.90) (.85) (.60) (.85) (.75) (.75) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.0888 RMSPE: 0.0206
Japan
-.01 .01 .01 .00 -.05 .00 -.03 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.10 -.08
(.90) (1.0) (.95) (.95) (.80) (1.0) (.45) (.25) (.30) (.25) (.15) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0606 RMSPE: 0.0219
Netherlands
-.05 -.07 -.04 -.03 -.02 .08 -.03 -.06 -.06 .00 .07 .09
(.65) (.55) (.80) (.85) (.95) (.85) (.45) (.20) (.30) (.95) (.40) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.0795 RMSPE: 0.0353
Norway
.17 .26 .22 .38 .36 .64 .05 .12 .12 .28 .27 .52
(.25) (.20) (.40) (.15) (.25) (.10) (.20) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0953 RMSPE: 0.0706
Portugal
.08 -.06 -.09 -.19 -.16 -.19 -.00 .01 .03 .01 .04 -.01
(.55) (.55) (.60) (.40) (.50) (.40) (1.0) (.75) (.65) (.90) (.65) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.0857 RMSPE: 0.0901
Spain
.35 .33 .36 .24 .11 .10 .10 .07 .08 -.00 -.05 -.13
(.05) (.10) (.15) (.40) (.70) (.75) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.90) (.40) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1218 RMSPE: 0.0395
Sweden
-.13 -.15 -.17 -.16 -.22 -.05 .05 .17 .11 .22 .09 .26
(.30) (.30) (.45) (.45) (.35) (.85) (.30) (.05) (.20) (.05) (.35) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1596 RMSPE: 0.0823
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for each Annex B country under investigation using non-Annex B
countries and US states to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year 2004 (when the KP entered
into force) as the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective
probabilities of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Figure 11: Treatment in 2004: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for non-Annex B
countries in donor pool
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Figure 12: Treatment in 2004: Actual and synthetic CO2 emissions for US states in donor
pool
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Germany
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0454
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.00
(.85)
.20
(.05)
.12
(.05)
.23
(.05)
.13
(.10)
.11
(.20)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Great Britain
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0282
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.02
(.45)
.06
(.10)
−.00
(1.0)
.04
(.55)
.09
(.20)
.11
(.20)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Italy
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0189
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
.00
(.85)
.01
(.95)
−.03
(.55)
−.03
(.55)
−.05
(.55)
−.07
(.30)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Japan
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0200
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.02
(.45)
−.04
(.25)
−.05
(.35)
−.07
(.20)
−.11
(.10)
−.09
(.20)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Netherlands
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0353
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.03
(.25)
−.06
(.10)
−.06
(.25)
.01
(.90)
.07
(.35)
.10
(.20)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Norway
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0578
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.01
(.80)
.04
(.20)
.05
(.35)
.21
(.05)
.31
(.05)
.50
(.05)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Portugal
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0748
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.01
(.85)
.03
(.45)
.05
(.40)
.03
(.70)
.06
(.55)
.01
(.90)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Spain
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0331
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
.04
(.20)
.01
(.75)
.02
(.65)
−.06
(.20)
−.10
(.10)
−.17
(.05)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Sweden
N: 20
RMSPE: 0.0750
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
−.06
(.15)
.01
(.90)
−.05
(.45)
.03
(.65)
−.05
(.60)
.10
(.20)
04 05 06 07 08 09 10
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A.4 CO2 intensity as dependent variable
Table 9: Estimates for Treatment Effects (CO2 per GDP) based on non-Annex B Countries
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.08 .08 .03
(.45) (.60) (.85)
RMSPE: 0.2353
Austria
.07 .19 .20 .29 .31 .19 .13 .15 .22
(.45) (.25) (.20) (.20) (.35) (.35) (.70) (.50) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1479
Belgium
-.05 .05 .04 .04 .12 .15 .18 .17 .27
(.55) (.80) (.85) (.80) (.60) (.55) (.60) (.50) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1085
Canada
.03 .04 .06 .06 .05 .07 .04 .01
(.75) (.65) (.70) (.80) (.90) (.75) (.65) (.95)
RMSPE: 0.0760
Finland
.15 .29 .25 .05 .33 .19 .04 .11 .29
(.20) (.15) (.15) (.75) (.30) (.35) (.80) (.55) (.40)
RMSPE: 0.1536
France
.01 .19 .30 .39 .46 .63 .66 .59 .81
(.80) (.30) (.15) (.20) (.25) (.20) (.25) (.25) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.1616
Germany
-.05 -.06 -.11 -.13 -.11 -.15 -.14 -.11 -.11
(.55) (.70) (.45) (.45) (.55) (.40) (.60) (.55) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.1769
Great Britain
-.00 .10 .10 .19 .25 .35 .36 .30 .48
(1.0) (.65) (.50) (.35) (.35) (.30) (.35) (.45) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1284
Italy
.14 .26 .35 .45 .50 .44 .33 .34 .44
(.20) (.25) (.15) (.20) (.15) (.25) (.35) (.35) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1522
Japan
.07 .09 .12 .15 .18 .21 .21 .21 .26
(.45) (.65) (.45) (.45) (.35) (.35) (.55) (.50) (.50)
RMSPE: 0.1735
Netherlands
.05 .13 .18 .12 .14 .22 .27 .29 .42
(.55) (.50) (.25) (.50) (.55) (.35) (.45) (.40) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1435
Norway
-.04 .10 .07 .07 .18 .11 .29 .15 .44
(.70) (.60) (.65) (.70) (.35) (.60) (.30) (.50) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.2199
Portugal
.08 .04 .08 .09 -.04 .02 -.14 -.09 -.11
(.30) (.80) (.55) (.55) (.95) (.95) (.60) (.60) (.65)
RMSPE: 0.0935
Spain
.08 .18 .30 .43 .40 .51 .40 .23 .28
(.35) (.35) (.15) (.20) (.30) (.20) (.35) (.50) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1359
Sweden
.09 .05 .01 .01 -.00 -.03 .01 -.02 .15
(.20) (.80) (.90) (.90) (.95) (.95) (.85) (.90) (.60)
RMSPE: 0.2353
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per GDP for each Annex B country under investi-
gation using non-Annex B countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as
the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities
of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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A.5 CO2 per capita as dependent variable
Table 10: Estimates for Treatment Effects (CO2 per capita) based on non-Annex B Coun-
tries
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.04 .09 -.00
(.55) (.45) (1.0)
RMSPE: 0.0446
Austria
.09 .19 .15 .14 .19 .22 .30 .19 .41
(.25) (.05) (.30) (.25) (.15) (.40) (.30) (.45) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0688
Belgium
-.03 .06 .01 -.04 -.01 .01 .06 .07 .18
(.65) (.55) (.90) (.80) (.95) (1.0) (.85) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1090
Canada
.04 .03 .03 .04 .03 .03 .00 -.05
(.35) (.55) (.50) (.70) (.80) (.85) (1.0) (.75)
RMSPE: 0.0560
Finland
.14 .27 .21 -.05 .23 .24 .17 .11 .35
(.10) (.05) (.15) (.75) (.15) (.35) (.50) (.65) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0967
France
.01 .13 .16 .12 .15 .29 .31 .24 .41
(.95) (.25) (.30) (.40) (.35) (.35) (.35) (.45) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1451
Germany
-.02 .03 .04 -.00 .04 .06 .09 .07 .11
(.70) (.70) (.75) (1.0) (.70) (.80) (.70) (.75) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0995
Great Britain
.01 .12 .10 .06 .14 .29 .36 .21 .43
(.80) (.25) (.35) (.65) (.45) (.35) (.30) (.45) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0768
Italy
.07 .12 .10 .06 .13 .21 .25 .11 .25
(.35) (.25) (.35) (.60) (.50) (.45) (.45) (.65) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0720
Japan
.05 .04 .07 .03 .07 .08 .09 .04 .11
(.35) (.70) (.50) (.90) (.60) (.75) (.70) (.75) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0681
Netherlands
.04 .10 .14 .09 .08 .17 .20 .20 .36
(.55) (.35) (.30) (.45) (.60) (.50) (.50) (.45) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0758
Norway
-.07 .05 .03 .02 .10 .05 .21 .20 .44
(.35) (.60) (.75) (.95) (.55) (.85) (.35) (.40) (.25)
RMSPE: 0.1180
Portugal
.09 -.03 -.07 -.07 -.12 -.08 -.06 -.06 -.10
(.15) (.70) (.50) (.45) (.35) (.70) (.75) (.70) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.0702
Spain
.07 .01 .06 .07 .07 .05 -.02 -.10 -.13
(.30) (.85) (.55) (.45) (.60) (.85) (.90) (.65) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1050
Sweden
.12 .15 .16 .08 .07 .10 .14 .04 .29
(.10) (.20) (.25) (.45) (.60) (.70) (.55) (.75) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.1468
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per capita for each Annex B country under inves-
tigation using non-Annex B countries to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as
the time of treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities
of finding such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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Table 11: Estimates for Treatment Effects (CO2 per capita) based on US States
Country
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia
.05 .12 .04
(.20) (.05) (.35)
RMSPE: 0.0614
Austria
.08 .22 .13 .17 .18 .13 .19 .13 .17
(.10) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.15) (.10) (.15) (.10)
RMSPE: 0.0620
Belgium
-.01 .08 -.01 -.02 .01 -.03 .02 .08 .10
(.70) (.10) (.70) (.45) (.80) (.65) (.65) (.50) (.30)
RMSPE: 0.0561
Canada
.06 .00 .02 .03 .05 .05 .04 -.00
(.05) (.90) (.50) (.50) (.30) (.30) (.70) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0469
Finland
.13 .29 .19 -.02 .24 .21 .12 .11 .29
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.45) (.05) (.05) (.25) (.25) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0820
France
.08 .08 .03 .02 .17 .17 .20 .21 .27
(.15) (.10) (.40) (.50) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1024
Germany
-.01 .01 -.01 -.03 -.00 -.05 .02 .10 .16
(.55) (.75) (.75) (.40) (.90) (.45) (.80) (.40) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0512
Great Britain
.04 .07 .01 .01 .14 .12 .16 .10 .16
(.25) (.10) (.60) (.75) (.05) (.25) (.25) (.45) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.0503
Italy
.06 .14 .08 .08 .10 .07 .10 .03 .01
(.20) (.05) (.10) (.15) (.20) (.30) (.30) (.75) (.90)
RMSPE: 0.0540
Japan
.02 .04 .04 .04 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.03
(.45) (.40) (.20) (.30) (.90) (.90) (.65) (.50) (.70)
RMSPE: 0.0187
Netherlands
.10 .14 .09 .06 .14 .17 .25 .28 .37
(.10) (.05) (.10) (.15) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0650
Norway
-.04 .14 .07 .07 .13 .13 .34 .30 .50
(.25) (.05) (.10) (.15) (.05) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.1020
Portugal
.09 -.01 .04 .03 -.05 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.14
(.10) (.85) (.20) (.40) (.30) (.40) (.30) (.50) (.15)
RMSPE: 0.1355
Spain
.10 .17 .15 .19 .19 .18 .16 .05 -.06
(.10) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.15) (.65) (.55)
RMSPE: 0.1510
Sweden
.22 .15 .08 .03 .14 .12 .17 .11 .36
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.45) (.05) (.25) (.15) (.30) (.05)
RMSPE: 0.0896
Note: The Table contains treatment effect estimates for CO2 emissions per capita for each Annex B country under inves-
tigation using US states to construct the synthetic counterfactuals and considering the year of ratification as the time of
treatment. For each country, we display the yearly treatment effects in percent and the respective probabilities of finding
such an effect in parenthesis. Finally, we report the (pre-treatment) RMSPE for each country.
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